Missives from the 6th Floor

Save for a couple of chapters - which I suspect are there to "prove" to the reader that Schelling can be mathematically rigorous - the book is quite readable. Probably the most significant take-away I had (and no doubt I'm about to reveal my true lack of understanding to those "in the know" ) is that in bargaining games the players have a mutual interest in finding a solution vs. no solution, and thus many of the tenets of classical game theory don't apply, or have significantly different implications than normal.

Several chapters examine games (in the formal sense) where there either is no "solution" according to game theory, or where the solution is for both players to adopt their security position (minimize loss) and gain nothing. He then shows, sometimes through reasoned argument, sometimes with support of empirical evidence, that these games can often be played successfully (where success means a mutually beneficial solution is reached, even if that solution isn't optimal for one or both players) by using the inherent structure of the game as inputs to our intuition.

He spends time looking at games with the introduction of "threat", "bluff", "commitment" as "moves" which leads into an interesting discussion of trust and credibility (i.e. how do I know if you'll stand by your commitment/threat - and what decisions can I make based on that conclusion?).

He applies this framework he builds up to the Cold War and the so-called Balance of Terror, and the last few chapters draw some very interesting (and oft unsettling) conclusions about how to "win" at the game of limited war.

Not a light read, but quite interesting. And bonus points for foot-notes that span pages and, in other texts, would be chapters in their own right.